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Abstract—Insider threats continue to present a major chal-
lenge for the information security community. Despite constant
research taking place in this area; a substantial gap still exists
between the requirements of this community and the solutions
that are currently available. This paper uses the CERT dataset
r4.2 along with a series of machine learning classifiers to predict
the occurrence of a particular malicious insider threat scenario
- the uploading sensitive information to wiki leaks before
leaving the organization. These algorithms are aggregated into
a meta-classifier which has a stronger predictive performance
than its constituent models. It also defines a methodology for
performing pre-processing on organizational log data into daily
user summaries for classification, and is used to train multi-
ple classifiers. Boosting is also applied to optimise classifier
accuracy. Overall the models are evaluated through analysis
of their associated confusion matrix and Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curve, and the best performing classifiers
are aggregated into an ensemble classifier. This meta-classifier
has an accuracy of 96.2% with an area under the ROC curve
of 0.988.
Keywords-Classification; Malicious Insider Threat; Machine-
Learning; Supervised Learning; Security;
I. INTRODUCTION
Malicious insider threat (MIT) is defined as someone
who is motivated to adversely impact the mission of an
organization with respect to the confidentiality, integrity or
availability of information using the privileges associated
with their role [1]. Insider attack makes up a considerable
portion of the cyber-threat landscape, with around 40% of
organizations labelling the vector as the most damaging
faced [2], and that malicious insiders and hackers make up
47% of data breaches [3]. MIT is also the most costly per
record to resolve ($155.6 per leaked record [3]).
Despite the frequent occurrence of IT attacks, detection
and mitigation remain problematic. In 2018, 90% of com-
panies considered themselves vulnerable to insider threats
[4]. A further 38% of companies admit that their detection
and prevention capabilities are inadequate [2], and which
demonstrates a substantial gap between the current advance-
ments in MIT detection and growing security requirements.
Given the availability of computational resources, using
Machine Learning (ML) techniques to solve problems of
larger complexity is increasingly a viable option.
As a field, data-driven approaches to detecting MIT is
increasing, but front-line attempts still report more effec-
tive models than where machine learning has been applied
[5]. These initial attempts have often used a Graph-Based
approach [6] and fuzzy logic-based anomaly detection ap-
proaches [7].
This paper presents a new methodology for processing
organizational log data into a format for classifying whether
particular individuals belong to a particular threat archetype
on a daily basis. It then outlines the training of multiple
learning algorithms in order to classify this threat scenario,
while experimenting with boosted and non-boosted learning
methods. The best performing algorithms are aggregated
using a probability vote in order to create a model which
has the largest area under ROC curve of all the developed
models.
The contributions of our work can be summarized as:
• A methodology for splitting MIT into subcategories
to improve predictive performance when compared
to previous prediction approaches, which largely treat
insider threat as a single category. MIT can take a
number of forms, this can complicate prediction for
these techniques. The present work identifies a model
by which individual threat archetypes are detected
through supervised learning algorithms.
• Investigation of boosting when optimizing the per-
formance of classification algorithms in the field of
application.
• Demonstrates an approach for aggregating high-
performance classifiers into an optimal meta-classifier
in the MIT domain.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
provides a related literature review, Section III introduces
the MIT scenario addressed by the approach. Section IV
presents our approach to detecting malicious activities in
synthetic organizational records. Section V offers an evalu-
ation of our proposed model and, finally, Section VI draws
conclusions giving some pointers for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
The most popular approach for dealing with MITs remains
unsupervised, anomaly-detection based approaches [8]. One
unsupervised approach - and which was applied to the CERT
dataset r6.2 - uses a deep neural network to establish a
baseline of normal behaviour for each user for each day
and compare to new days against. When anomaly scores are
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organized into employee percentiles for each day, almost
every malicious employee is placed well above the 95th
percentile for high anomaly scores [9]. This shows great
potential in having the ability to quickly create a shortlist
of high-risk individuals. However, these systems often lack
the capacity to identify positive or negative cases of insider
threat. They also give no indication as to the nature of
the anomaly, whether it could be a malicious event or it
could just be caused by employees breaking their usual
work habits in innocuous ways. The task then falls on
the security operations center (SOC) to classify the nature
of the anomaly. This, though, can be laborious and time
consuming.
These drawbacks can be mitigated when using classifi-
cation techniques to identify insider threat by training spe-
cific models to identify particular attack scenarios. Despite
this potential of breaking MIT into smaller categories for
prediction, this approach has been rarely identified in the
literature. Instances of classifiers being used in research to
predict MIT tend to treat MIT as a single class of problem. In
addition, data sources used for MIT classification can vary.
Most of the data sets used in related classification problems
use log information from the systems that individuals have
accessed. This can be further sub-categorised into synthetic,
non-synthetic and mixed log data. However, recent research
also shows data being analyzed from a plethora of different
sources.
One example of an approach that breaks the convention of
predicting MIT from logs uses psycho-physiological signal
data to train Support Vector Machines (SVMs). This is
taken from electroencephalography and electrocardiogram
sensors which are placed on a small group of participating
individuals who either performed an intentional MIT activity
or were benign. This data is then used to train SVMs to
classify instances with an average accuracy of 86% [10].
While this approach was able to perform with a reasonable
accuracy, it is difficult to say whether this would be true
in a non-staged MIT environment. In addition, the sample
size was only 10, and this would have to be tested on a
much larger population sub-sample in order for the resultant
classifier to be credible. Finally, even if the equipment were
available to feasibly perform this kind of analysis, there may
be further obstacles when acquiring consent from employees
around undergoing full-time analysis at work.
Another example that appears in the research uses both
classification and clustering techniques on real-world orga-
nizational data [11]. This two-pronged approach attempts to
predict which employees in the organization are likely to
quit using classification while also using an unsupervised
approach to detect which users may be insider threats. The
classifier had an accuracy of 73.4% when detecting quitters.
The unsupervised approach for detecting insider threats was
effective in that all insider threat cases had an anomaly
measure of above the median score. However, this tended
to be the norm among the scores of benign individuals
also, casting doubt on the effectiveness of this approach for
predicting insider threat as a single class.
One final, single-pronged approach, creates a classifier us-
ing the CERT synthetic dataset r6.2 to predict insider threat.
Here researchers compare the performance of traditional
machine learning algorithms against their long short-term
memory recurrent neural network. This classifier achieved
an accuracy of 93.85%, outperforming the next most ac-
curate algorithm by around 5% [8]. This accuracy was
achieved through thoroughly pre-possessing the initial log
data. Firstly, events are standardized and aggregated into a
format around the behaviours and attributes of individuals.
Features are then extracted for the training phase and testing
phases respectively.
Our methodology takes into consideration the other ap-
proaches of MIT detection proposed in the literature but
it expands upon this through introducing boosting, stacked
classifiers and the use of behavioural archetypes to narrow
down on the scope of prediction.
III. MALICIOUS INSIDER THREAT MODEL
Following the prevalence of previous approaches in pre-
dicting insider threats in the CERT synthetic dataset ecosys-
tem [8] [9], this source was chosen to perform our ex-
periments. However, instead of choosing r6.2 with only
one instance of each threat, r4.2 was chosen. Unlike r6.2,
r4.2 was created as a dense needle data set. This contains
a large number of positive cases of each threat scenario.
This is an ideal classification problem as there is a vast
wealth of positive cases which predictive models can learn
the structure of. With more true cases to learn from, the
resultant classifier is likely to be far more adept at correctly
identifying true future cases.
Dataset Version 4.2 contains around 20GB of employee
activity logs for 1000 employees over 17 months. Three
different attack scenarios have been simulated, each allo-
cated 30 malicious employees from the 1000 employee pool.
These are described as follows:
1) User who did not previously use removable drives
or work after hours starts to logging in after hours,
using a removable drive, and uploading data to wik-
ileaks.org. Leaves the organization shortly thereafter.
2) User begins surfing job websites and soliciting em-
ployment from a competitor. Before leaving the com-
pany, they use a thumb drive (at markedly higher rates
than their previous activity) to steal data.
3) System administrator becomes disgruntled. He down-
loads a key-logger and uses a thumb drive to transfer
it to his supervisor’s machine. The next day, he uses
the collected key logs to log in as his supervisor and
send out an alarming mass email, causing panic in the
organization. He leaves the organization immediately.
Despite previous research [8], the authors in this work did
not focus on creating a general-purpose model for predicting
MIT regardless of the MIT scenario category. As the three
scenarios provided suggest, MIT can take many forms. Not
all scenarios will carry a similar signature. Any model
which is applied to MIT as a blanket solution will need
to be vague enough not to rule out MIT cases which are
distinct in nature, but also well-fitted enough to actually
catch cases of MIT in their particular scenarios. One model
per scenario ensures that even small nuances in each case
are learned, whereas a more generalized model may become
less accurate if classifying threats across a wider spectrum.
If this is successful, the dependent variable can be turned
into a categorical variable to predict each distinct scenario.
However, this categorical approach may not be compatible
with some kinds of learning algorithms and may also create
unnecessary noise for algorithms to deal with. A potentially
better approach would be to train a separate model to detect
each separate threat scenario. This would allow each model
to be as well fitted to its specific scenario as possible.
Data set r4.2 is originally composed by the following sets
of logs: 1) Employee Login/Logoff event logs; 2) Device
Connect/ Disconnect event logs; 3) Employee HTTP event
logs; 4) Monthly Record of Employees; 5) Psychometric
Profiles of Employees; and 6) File Accesses.
IV. METHODOLOGY
A. Data Aggregation and Feature Selection
In order to decide which elements should be aggregated
to generate features, threat scenario one is further analyzed.
Three key traits of the scenario are identified: 1) Users
who are not usually device users suddenly start using a
device; 2)Users who usually only log in during work hours
start logging on after work hours; and 3)Users leave the
organization shortly after the incident.
Data is aggregated from the logs to give a summary
of each individual in the organization with respect to the
information identified. This is done in daily time intervals as
this provides a good balance between time-frame granularity
and computational complexity of training. The approach is
outlined in Figure 1. With this approach, the aggregated
training data will take the form of a daily summary of each
employees activity. As only employees who have used a
device are capable of performing this MIT scenario, only
these employees have been included in the training data.
This reduces the number of employees from 1000 to 266.
In addition, in order to reduce training time, only data from
the month of July has been added to the set. This month
was chosen because it had the highest incidence of MIT.
After aggregating data for each employee who was active
during the month of July, we have a base training set of
7260 instances where only 18 are positive threat cases. In
order to reduce this set imbalance, a spread sub-sample of
negative cases is taken. This reduces the negative to positive
ratio to only 15 to 1, leaving a training set size of only 288
instances. The elements of this training data are the features
selected during the pre-processing phase.
The first trait of scenario one is an abnormality of device
usage. The probability of a device being used is calculated
for each employee using the information in the device
connection logs. Each employees probability of using a
device (P (D)) is derived using the Formula in Equation
1. U is the number of device connects associated with a
user and T is the total number of connect events in the log.
This probability for each employee is stored into a list. If
an employee uses a device on any day, the probability of
this happening is recorded as a feature. If there is no device
usage, this is recorded as 0.
P (D) =
U
T
Z =
X¯ − µ(
σ√
n
) (1)
The distribution of threat cases with regard to the proba-
bility of an employee using a device is shown in Figure 2.
The second signature of scenario one is an abnormality
in logon times. In order to turn this into a feature, a prob-
ability distribution is generated for the log in times of each
employee. This is achieved for each employee through the
following steps; All of the logon times for each individual
employee is compiled into a list. The mean (µ) and standard
deviation (σ) and number of logon time measurements (n)
are recorded for each employee. These can then be used
with each new logon time on each new day (X¯) for each
employee to create Z-scores (Z). This equation is shown in
Equation 2. These Z-scores can be plotted onto a normal
distribution curve using a Z-table.
This gives us the probability that any employee will log in
at any particular time, with respect to their personal habits.
The distribution of threat cases with regard to the probability
of an employee logging on at that time is shown in Figure
3.
The third identified trait of this threat scenario is employ-
ees leaving the organization shortly after the incident. Em-
ployee records are supplied in our data set. If the employee
isn’t in the records for any particular month, this means that
the employee is no longer employed in the organization. In
order to add this as a feature to our training data, when a
new day instance is being aggregated, the employee logs
for the current month and the next month are searched for
that user ID. The positive or negative results of this search
are then recorded as features for that user on that day. In
the data, all of the positive cases for this scenario were not
employed next month.
While the psychometric information was not directly
included in the threat scenario traits, this is still added as a
feature in the training data in order to test for significance.
Originally, this takes the form of a vector denoting the
employees score on the ’Big 5 Personality traits’ indexes.
These vectors were clustered into seven categories using a
simple k-means algorithm. The personality cluster for each
employee was then recorded into a list to be referenced
when generating the training data. This can be observed in
Figure 1. Architecture of data pre-processor
Figure 2. Histogram showing distribution of threat cases (shown in dark
grey) among the probabilities of employees using a device
Figure 3. Histogram showing distribution of threat cases (shown in dark
grey) among probability of an employee logging on at a particular time
Figure 4, true MIT cases only appear in four of the seven
psychometric categories.
Figure 4. Histogram showing distribution of threat cases (shown in dark
grey) among psychometric clusters
Finally, labeled threat cases are taken from the answers
section of data set version 4.2. The format of each instance
in the set is as follows: I)Employee log on time proba-
bility (continuous); II)Device Connect probability (contin-
uous); III)Is the employee employed this month? (boolean);
IV)Is the employee employed next month? (boolean); and
V)Psychometric cluster of employee (categorical).
B. Model Building
In order to build models on this training data, the Weka
toolkit was utilized [12]. Using this toolkit, multiple learning
algorithms were trained on the data. Each algorithm was
then compared against a boosted version of the same algo-
rithm. Boosting is where classifiers are trained iteratively,
at each iteration the incorrectly classified instances are
amplified in the training data in order to, ideally, improve
performance. After boosting, the resultant accuracy’s and
the area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
curve were compared to evaluate model performances. These
included: 1) Neural Network (NN); 2) Naive Bayesian
Network (NBN); 3) Support Vector Machine (SVM); 4)
Random Forest (RF); 5) Decision Tree (DT); and 6) Logistic
Regression (LR).
Results are shown in Tables I and II. Models are validated
using 10-fold cross validation [13]
Table I
CLASSIFIER ACCURACY’S BEFORE BOOSTING
Classifier NN NBN SVM RF DT LR
Accuracy 95.8% 91.3% 95.4% 97.5% 96.1% 96.5%
Area under ROC 0.974 0.954 0.872 0.982 0.915 0.983
Table II
CLASSIFIER ACCURACIES AFTER BOOSTING
Classifier NN NBN SVM RF DT LR
Accuracy 95.8% 97.2% 97.2% 97.2% 97.2% 96.8%
Area under ROC 0.952 0.980 0.980 0.888 0.932 0.802
The results of boosting are mixed. Some are improved
by the boosting approach and some do not perform as
well. The best performing classifiers are selected to be
aggregated into a heterogeneous stack classifier. The best
performers are identified using the ROC and accuracy values
shown in Tables I and II. These algorithms are: 1)Neural
Network; 2)Boosted naive Bayesian Network; 3)Boosted
Support Vector Machine; 4)Random Forest; and Logistic
Regression
The aforementioned algorithms are aggregated into a
single metalearner using probability vote. By combining
algorithms in this way, we can leverage the strengths of
separate models to approximate a greater area under the
ROC [14]. In Figure 5, the shaded area outside of both of the
functions is approximated by combining methods A and B.
Similarly, the area between the ROCs of the five identified
models is approximated. This is achieved by combining the
classifiers using probability vote, allocating the vote weight
based on the probability of each classifier being correct. This
learner missed only correctly classified 14 out of 18 true
cases and 262 out of 270 false cases.
Figure 5. Graph demonstrating performance approximation of models A
and B [14].
In Table III, the performance of the meta-learner is com-
pared against the next best performing classifier; a boosted
naive Bayesian network. In Figure 7, we see the ROC curve
of the meta-learner.
Table III
METALEARNER PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
MetaLearner Boosted NBN Difference
Accuracy 96.2% 97.2% -1%
Area Under ROC 0.988 0.980 0.08%
Figure 6. ROC curve showing predictive performance of the meta-learner.
MIT cases are in dark grey, non-MIT cases are in light grey.
V. EVALUATION
A. Pre-processing
During the course of this work, one archetypal threat
scenario was analyzed and a data pre-processing approach
was developed to optimize instance data for predicting this
scenario. While the original data set was large and complex,
this was significantly distilled in order to create instances
out of just five data points. The histograms representing the
instance attributes in figures 2 to 5 each show a discernible
split between the MIT and non-MIT cases. The quality of
these features is demonstrated by the performance metrics
of the algorithms that trained upon them. Each classifier
that trained upon the data had an accuracy of at least 95%,
which is highly accurate. The only common factor present
in training the classifiers that produced these performance
metrics was the data created during the pre-processing phase.
B. MIT Category Granularity vs. Workload Trade-off
Despite the quality of training data, our approach ad-
dresses only one threat archetype at the present time. The
authors intend to expand this; developing alternative models
for separate categories. Using this approach, similar pre-
processing will have to be performed for each MIT sce-
nario. This represents a greater pre-processing workload
than approaches that treat MIT as a single category. By
extension, this is also true for any learning algorithms that
will be trained. Separate classifiers will have to be trained
for separate archetypes.
In order to combat the increase in workload associated
with the finer granularity in MIT category, different levels
of archetypal nuance can be established in order to optimize
the number of archetypes to the associated pre-processing
and training workload. In the training data, there were only
three archetypes. This is likely to be different in real-world
scenarios. In real data, there is likely to be an entire spectrum
of insider threat scenarios. This spectrum, however, could
be split into a number of subcategories, where scenarios in
each category carry similarities. The more times that MIT
has been divided into subcategories.
The more work that will be involved in the pre-processing
as more training data sets will need to be developed and
subsequently more models will need to be trained on these
separate sets. Having said this, on the basis of the results
observed in this study, it can be hypothesized that the greater
the nuance in MIT category, the more accurate the learner
is likely to be.
C. Metalearner Performance
While the accuracy of prediction is not improved through
the aggregation of high-performance models into a prob-
ability vote meta-learner, the Area under the ROC is the
greatest of all that have been observed. This shows that,
in respect to this metric, the meta-learner is greater than
each of its constituent classifiers. While the overall accuracy
suffers in this approach, this is only due to the fact that a
small number of negative cases have been classified as true.
The large area under the ROC shows that more true cases
have been identified correctly than any other model. The
cost of incorrectly identifying an insider as MIT is the cost
of a SOC analyst verifying that this insider has not, in fact,
performed one of the threat scenarios. The cost of incorrectly
identifying a true insider case as negative is the cost of
the data breach. Depending on sensitivity and quantity of
records that are leaked, this could cost millions. For this
reason, the authors have identified the meta-learner as the
most fit for purpose model developed during this research.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, a new methodology for pre-processing
insider threat to optimize classification results based on
insider threat categories is established. The resultant data
set produced using the established methodology is used
to train a series of classifiers which all outperform the
predictive performance of previous strategies identified in
the research. The most performant of these models are
aggregated into a meta-learner algorithm using probability
vote. This produces a model with a ROC curve containing
a greater area underneath than any of the other models that
were explored in this work. This indicates the suitability of
this approach for improving overall classifier performance.
On the basis of results identified, this work could be
further expanded by tailoring instance data to the other
two scenarios present in data set r4.2. A general model
could also be developed on this data in order to test the
hypothesis that instance data tailored to each scenario creates
more performant classifiers than one generalized classifier.
In addition these features could possibly be extended using
a genetic algorithm approach, this may produce features of
higher quality. Finally, real-life data could be used to train
future models relating to red-team simulated scenarios. This
would allow the effectiveness of this approach to be tested in
the wild, further validating it’s applicability to this problem
domain.
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